# FORMAL METHODS IN NETWORKING COMPUTER SCIENCE 598D, SPRING 2010 PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

## LIGHTWEIGHT MODELING IN PROMELA/SPIN AND ALLOY

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bool user1mod = false; bool user2mod = false;

```
proctype user1 (chan in, out) {
```

confirmed: do

:: in?invite; out!accept
:: in?bye; out!byeAck; goto end
:: out!invite; goto reInviting
:: user1mod;

out!bye; goto Byeing

od; relnviting: do

:: in?invite; out!race

:: in?accept; user1mod = true;

goto confirmed

:: in?race; goto confirmed

:: in?bye; out!byeAck; goto end
od;

Byeing: do

:: in?invite

:: in?bye; out!byeAck

:: in?byeAck; goto end

od;

end: assert(user1mod && user2mod) }

DOMAIN ASSUMPTION: a user process does not end the session until it has modified the session at least once proctype user2 (chan in, out) { confirmed: do :: in?invite; out!accept :: in?bye; out!byeAck; goto end :: out!invite; goto relnviting ••••••• :: user2mod; out!bye; goto Byeing od; relnviting: do :: in?invite; out!race :: in?accept; user2mod = true;

goto confirmed

:: in?race; goto confirmed

:: in?bye; out!byeAck; goto end

od;

Byeing: do

:: in?invite

:: in?bye; out!byeAck

:: in?byeAck; goto end

od;

end: assert(user1mod && user2mod) }

REQUIREMENT: in every end state, each user has modified the session at least once

bool user1mod = false; bool user2mod = false;

```
proctype user1 (chan in, out) {
```

confirmed: do

:: in?invite; out!accept :: in?bye; out!byeAck; goto end :: out!invite; goto relnviting :: user1mod; ••

out!bye; goto Byeing

od;

relnviting: do

:: in?invite; out!race

:: in?accept; user1mod = true;

goto confirmed

:: in?race; goto confirmed

:: in?bye; out!byeAck; goto end od:

Byeing: do

- :: in?invite
- :: in?bye; out!byeAck
- :: in?byeAck; goto end

od;

assert(user1mod && user2mod) } end: end:

DOMAIN ASSUMPTION: a user process does not end the session until it has modified the session at least once proctype user2 (chan in, out) { confirmed: do :: in?invite; out!accept :: in?bye; out!byeAck; goto end :: out!invite; goto relnviting :: user2mod; out!bye; goto Byeing od; relnviting: do :: in?invite; out!race :: in?accept; user2mod = true; goto confirmed :: in?race; goto confirmed :: in?bye; out!byeAck; goto end od: Byeing: do

:: in?invite

- :: in?bye; out!byeAck
- :: in?byeAck; goto end
- od;
- assert(user1mod && user2mod) }

the assumption is not sufficient, because either user can end the session unilaterally, and the other user may not have acted yet

bool user1mod = false; bool user2mod = false; this version solves the problem by strengthening the domain assumption

they are used only to check that the specification satisfies a •• conditional requirement, so they will not be implemented!

proctype user1 (chan in, out) {	proctype user2 (chan in, out) {		
confirmed: do :: in?invite; out!accept :: in?bye; out!byeAck; goto end :: out!invite; goto reInviting :: user1mod && user2mod; out!bye; goto Byeing od;	confirmed: do :: in?invite; out!accept :: in?bye; out!byeAck; goto end :: out!invite; goto reInviting :: user2mod && user1mod; out!bye; goto Byeing od;		
relnviting: do :: in?invite; out!race :: in?accept; user1mod = true; goto confirmed :: in?race; goto confirmed :: in?bye; out!byeAck; goto end od;	relnviting: do :: in?invite; out!race :: in?accept; user2mod = true; goto confirmed :: in?race; goto confirmed :: in?bye; out!byeAck; goto end od;		
Byeing: do :: in?invite :: in?bye; out!byeAck :: in?byeAck; goto end od; end: assert(user1mod && user2mod) }	Byeing: do :: in?invite :: in?bye; out!byeAck :: in?byeAck; goto end od; end: assert(user1mod && user2mod) }		

### LIGHTNING OVERVIEW OF LINEAR-TIME TEMPORAL

### LOGIC (LTL)

	A LOGIC, I.E., A L -VALUED FORMU			AN LTL FORMULA IS RESPECT TO A STATE ACE)
Ρ	state predicate	not temporal	P ? (P tr	ue of first state in trace)
ΡUQ	P until Q	P and Q are mutually.::: exclusive	•Q?; PC	Q ? …, P … (weak) Q ? … (strong)
ПР	always P	invariance	P… (P is tru	e of every state in trace)
¢р	eventually P	guarantee	P?;?P ?P?	? (P is true of at least one state)
□фр	always eventually P	recurrence	?P?P ?P?P	(in every state, eventually P; if trace terminates, P is true in final state)
⊘□р	eventually always P	stability	?P	(eventually, P becomes invariantly true)

### **LTL AND SPIN**

### **"SAFETY" PROPERTY**

- usually, an invariance
- falsifiable by a finite trace prefix

#### "LIVENESS" OR "PROGRESS" PROPERTY

- contains a guarantee
- not falsifiable by a finite trace prefix

note: all real-time deadlines are safety properties

#### **DEFAULT CHECKING IN SPIN**

- specific invariances
- invalid end state: [] ! (terminal state && process not in "end")
- assertion violation: (program counter at assertion && assertion not true in current state)
- requirement in SIP Versions 6 and 7 is a safety property, is not good enough because a user process could be starved forever

#### LTL CHECKING IN SPIN

- can check any temporal formula, including progress properties
- the SIP requirements we really want are:

 $\Box$  (user1tried —>  $\diamondsuit$  user1mod)

 $\Box$  (user2tried —>  $\diamondsuit$  user2mod)

the response pattern

SIP guarantees a response to the caller (user1) by giving caller. static priority

proctype user1 (chan in, out) { proctype user2 (chan in, out) { confirmed: do confirmed: do :: in?invite; out!accept :: in?invite; out!accept :: in?bye; out!byeAck; goto end :: in?bye; out!byeAck; goto end :: out!invite; user1tried = true; :: out!invite; user2tried == true; goto relnviting goto relnviting :: user1mod && user2mod; :: user2mod && user1mod; out!bye; goto Byeing out!bye; goto Byeing od: od: relnviting: do relnviting: do •••• :: in?invite; out!accept :: in?invite; out!race :: in?accept; user1mod = true; :: in?accept; user2mod = true; goto confirmed goto confirmed :: in?race; goto confirmed :: in?race; goto confirmed :: in?bye; out!byeAck; goto end :: in?bye; out!byeAck; goto end od: od; Byeing: do Byeing: do :: in?invite :: in?invite :: in?bye; out!byeAck :: in?bye; out!byeAck :: in?byeAck; goto end :: in?byeAck; goto end od; od; skip } skip } end: end:

#### □ (user1tried —> ♦ user1mod) now holds for all traces

SIP guarantees a response to the caller (user1) by giving caller. static priority

static priority proctype user1 (chan in, out) { proctype user2 (chan in, out) { confirmed: do confirmed: do :: in?invite; out!accept :: in?invite; out!accept :: in?bye; out!byeAck; goto end :: in?bye; out!byeAck; goto end :: out!invite; user1tried = true; :: out!invite; user2tried == true; goto relnviting goto relnviting :: user1mod && user2mod; :: user2mod && user1mod; out!bye; goto Byeing out!bye; goto Byeing od: od: relnviting: do relnviting: do •••• :: in?invite; out!accept :: in?invite; out!race :: in?accept; user1mod = true; :: in?accept; user2mod = true; goto confirmed goto confirmed :: in?race; goto confirmed :: in?race; goto confirmed :: in?bye; out!byeAck; goto end :: in?bye; out!byeAck; goto end od; od; Byeing: do Byeing: do :: in?invite :: in?invite :: in?bye; out!byeAck :: in?bye; out!byeAck :: in?byeAck; goto end :: in?byeAck; goto end od; od; skip } skip } end: end:

 $\Box$  (user2tried —>  $\diamondsuit$  user2mod)

by means of a cycle in the

reachability graph

is not true for all traces, detectable

#### **SIP VERSION 9 SIP** implementations use timers to achieve specified behavior now both processes are proctype user1 (chan in, out) { guaranteed a now user1 lets response user2 in if it has confirmed: do lost a race :: in?invite; out!accept; proctype user2 (chan in, out) { user2accepted = true :: in?bye; out!byeAck; goto end confirmed: do :: !user2lost || user2accepted; ..... :: in?invite; out!accept :: in?bye; out!byeAck; goto end out!invite; user1tried = true; goto relnviting :: out!invite; user2tried == true; :: user1mod && user2mod; goto relnviting :: user2mod && user1mod; out!bye; goto Byeing out!bye; goto Byeing od; relnviting: do od: relnviting: do :: in?invite; out!race; user2lost = true :: in?invite; out!accept :: in?accept; user1mod = true; :: in?accept; user2mod = true; goto confirmed qoto confirmed :: in?race; goto confirmed :: in?race; goto confirmed :: in?bye; out!byeAck; goto end :: in?bye; out!byeAck; goto end od; od; Byeing: do Byeing: do :: in?invite :: in?invite :: in?bye; out!byeAck :: in?bye; out!byeAck :: in?byeAck; goto end :: in?byeAck; goto end od; od; skip } skip } end: end:

### **OTHER SPIN OPTIONS**

### SEARCH

- default search (traversal of reachability graph) is depth-first
- can search breadth-first
- can limit depth of search

there is a default of 10K, so you may have to increase limit

#### MEMORY—USUALLY THE SCARCEST RESOURCE

- default is 128 Mb
- can increase it by factors of 2
- compression saves memory with modest cost in time
- supertrace saves a lot of memory, but search is no longer complete

visited states are stored in a hash table, where multiple states may be indistinguishable

### FEATURES I HAVE LITTLE USE FOR

- random or manual simulation mode (simulation guided by an error trail is essential!)
- turning off partial order reduction (an optimization that appears to have no disadvantages)

weak fairness

probably too weak to make your model run correctly

how does an implementor implement a system whose specification is only correct with fairness built in?

strong fairness might make your model run correctly, but it is too expensive for Spin to offer

### TALES OF SIP (THE SESSION INITIATION PROTOCOL)

#### SIP IS THE DOMINANT SIGNALING PROTOCOL FOR IP-BASED MULTIMEDIA APPLICATIONS

#### • telecommunications

voice-over-IP video chat large-scale conferencing telemonitoring

computer-supported cooperative work

embedded telecommunications distance learning emergency services virtual reality

computer-supported cooperative play

multiplayer games collaborative television networked music performance

#### SIP IS STANDARDIZED BY THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE (IETF)

- IETF philosophy is to standardize based on "rough consensus and working code"
- in the IETF, a finite-state machine is exotic
- IETF culture supports ignoring "corner cases"

a corner case is an unanticipated and undesirable situation, which is declared to be rare without evidence

the IETF is dominated by equipment manufacturers, who do not want standards

they standardize only under pressure from their customers, and participate in the IETF as a highly competitive game

### **TALES OF SIP: THE PROTOCOL SPECIFICATION**

#### SIP HAS BEEN, AND IS BEING, DEFINED **BOTTOM-UP IN RESPONSE TO AN** ENDLESS SERIES OF NEW USE CASES


- the base document (IETF RFC 3261) is 268 pages
- "A Hitchhiker's Guide to SIP" is a snapshot of SIP RFCs and drafts . . .
  - ... which lists 142 documents, totaling many thousands of pages
- everyone wants "simple SIP", and everyone has a different idea of what it should be
- opinions are based on a false opposition between generality and simplicity

no conception that a protocol based on better abstractions could be both more general and simpler

message overhead is too high

### THE DOCUMENTS

written in English, augmented only by message sequence charts that look like this (IETF macros):



compare these to the charts generated by Spin these are inviting, almost forcing, you to think that network communication is instantaneous!

not surprisingly, the standard is incomplete, inconsistent, or ambiguous in places

### TALES OF SIP: USING PROMELA/SPIN

#### MODELING

- we have a collection of SIP models
- we are gradually increasing their scope (bigger subsets of protocol, endpoint/server configurations)

#### **UNDERSTANDING SIP**

- models show what an endpoint must do to use and interpret the protocol correctly—this is far more complicated than previously understood
- on TCP vs. UDP: with non-FIFO communication, the reachability graph is 100 times the size of the FIFO reachability graph
- an RFC documents 7 race conditions—our model reveals those and 49 others of the same type

#### **DOCUMENTING SIP**

- we annotate our models with pointers to the relevant sections of RFCs
- as documentation, our models are guaranteed to be complete, consistent, and unambiguous
- also, you know where to find the answer to your question!

### **OTHER USES OF MODEL CHECKING**

- we verify the algorithms in our tools for SIP service creation, e.g., showing that media channels are controlled correctly
- we have modified Spin to generate test cases automatically; then we subject SIP components to thousands of tests with guaranteed coverage

### **EVALUATION OF PROMELA/SPIN**

### **SPIN**

- a powerful, industrial-strength tool
- mostly easy to use, with a few bad spots (horrible parser, false negatives in reporting unreachable code)

### PROMELA

- great for temporal modeling and assertions
- great for message channels
- primitive data structures (bool, byte, mtype, int, array)
- primitive data assertions (==, <, <=, >, >= on values)

## A SUGGESTED CLASS PROJECT

### **CREATE A MODEL OF TCP**

- SYN, FIN, ACK messages to create and destroy connections
- DATA messages with sequence numbers
- model out-of-order message delivery
- model how TCP provides FIFO message streams in both directions, and use Spin to verify correctness

### IF THAT WAS TOO EASY ...

also model message loss, show how TCP provides reliable, duplicate-free message streams in both directions, and use Spin to verify correctness